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Abstract:	  
The	  debate	  over	  the	  Muslim	  headscarf	  has	  become	  an	  arena	  of	  fervent	  discussion	  in	  Europe.	  Much	  
of	   the	  debate	   reveals	  an	  attempt	   to	  explain	   the	   issue	   in	  binary	   terms,	  between	  modern,	   ‘secular’,	  
universal	  and	   ‘religious’,	   traditional,	   local	  values.	   In	   this	  context,	   the	  hijab	  has	  become	  the	  symbol	  
and	  mirror	  of	  the	  so	  called	  ‘clash	  of	  civilisations’.	  Through	  the	  analysis	  of	  two	  cases	  sentenced	  by	  the	  
European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR),	  my	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  passionate	  debate	  over	  the	  veil	  is	  
a	  false	  one	  as	  the	  hijab	  emerges	  as	  a	  visible	  symbol	  of	  a	  clash	  between	  two	  legal-­‐political	  systems,	  
similar	  but	  contingently	  dissimilar:	   in	  fact,	  both	  Islamists	  and	  liberals	  aim	  at	  establishing	  a	  singular,	  
universal	  (positivized)	  law	  within	  the	  same	  territory	  through	  women’s	  body.	  Thus,	  what	  the	  analysis	  
of	   the	   ‘hijab	   cases’	   reveals,	   is	   not	   only	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   specific	   fixed	   and	   monolithic	  
Christian/secular/liberal	   law’s	   subject,	   but	   also	   that	   the	   universality	   of	   western	   thought	   has	  
precluded	   the	   possibility	   of	   imagining	   different	   forms	   of	   humanities	   and,	   along	   with	   it,	   a	   legal	  
pluralism	  able	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  new	  multi-­‐religious	  Europe.	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Introduction	  
The	   female	  headscarf	  has	  been	  a	   focal	  point	   for	  many	  polemical	  debates	  both	   in	   the	  West	  and	   in	  
societies	  with	  Muslim	  majorities	   and	   it	   is	   often	   understood	   as	   the	   symbol	   of	   an	   intrinsic	   ‘clash	   of	  
civilizations’	   between	   a	   ‘secular’	   and	   ‘tolerant’	   West	   and	   a	   ‘religious’	   and	   ‘backward’	   East.	   From	  
Strasbourg	   to	   Kandahar	   and	   Paris	   to	   Ankara,	   Muslim	   clerics	   and	   western/liberal	   jurists	   share	   a	  
certain	  obsession	  with	  the	  juridical	  regulation	  of	  women’s	  body.	  On	  the	  largely	  Christian	  or	  secular	  
European	  continent	  the	  veil	  features	  in	  prominent	  decisions	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
(ECHR)	  and	  remains	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  passionate,	  almost	  daily,	  debate.	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At	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   debate	   is	   whether	   a	   piece	   of	   cloth	   traditionally	   worn	   by	   women	   of	   various	  
cultures	   for	  many	   reasons	  and	   to	  many	  effects	   (Ahmed	  1992;	  El	  Guindi	  1999),	   should	  be	  allowed,	  
regulated	   or	   prohibited.	   Given	   that	   this	   apparent	   consensus	   between	   secularised	   Christians	   and	  
radicalised	  Islamists	  suggests	  the	  matter	  is	  important,	  I	  draw	  on	  Diamantides’	  analysis	  (2008;	  2006;	  
2012),	   who	   interpret	   the	   so	   called	   ‘clash	   of	   civilizations’	   as	   the	   progeny	   of	   similarity	   rather	   than	  
complete	   differences.	   If	   anything,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   common	   concern	  with	  Muslim	   female	   attire,	  
those	  two	  modern	  political	  and	   legal	  systems	  –secularised	  Christianity	  and	  fundamentalist	  political	  
Islam	  –	  should	  be	  examined	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  sameness	  and	  not	   in	  terms	  of	  difference.	   In	  fact,	  as	   I	  
shall	  argue,	  liberals	  and	  Islamists	  agree	  that	  the	  dress	  sense	  and	  sartorial	  modesty	  of	  Muslim	  women	  
cannot	   be	   a	   question	   of	   personal	   choice	   within	   the	   ordinary	   and	   changeable	   confines	   of	   current	  
fashion	   and	   public	   decency	   rules;	   where	   the	   two	   sides	   disagree	   is	   on	   whether	   to	   enforce	   the	   so	  
called	  religious	  dress	  code	  or	  its	  opposite,	  one	  that	  reveals	  more	  than	  conceals.	  While	  some	  Muslim	  
voices	  such	  as	  British	  Baroness	  Sayeed	  Warsi	  warn	  that	  “banning	  the	  veil	  is	  like	  a	  ban	  on	  miniskirts”	  
(Bingham	  2013)	  a	  much	  larger	  section	  of	  the	  population	  and	  the	  media	  are	  susceptible	  to	  the	  idea	  
that	   banning	   the	   veil	   is	   a	   necessary	  means	   to	   ‘liberate’	  Muslim	  women	   and	   to	   ‘save	   secular	   and	  
democratic	   values’.	   For	   some	   this	   means	   forcing	   them	   to	   be	   re-­‐born	   as	   subjects	   of	   occidental	  
Christian/secular1	   ‘universal’	   natural	   or	   human	   rights	   law.	   For	   their	   opponents	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	  
rebirth	  from	  which	  Muslim	  women	  must	  be	  protected	  –	  the	  rebirth	  of	  man	  and	  woman	  as	  a	  rootless	  
holder	  of	  natural	  rights	  who,	  since	  s/he	  possesses	  them,	  s/he	  can	  also	  agree	  to	  alienate	  them,	  sell	  
them,	  commoditize	  them.	  In	  essence,	  my	  analysis	  reveals	  a	  symmetry	  between	  the	  use	  of	  western	  
positive	   law,	  human	  rights	   law,	  and	   ‘positivized’	  Shari’a	   law	  –	  such	  as	  that	  proposed	  by	   Islamists	  –	  
not	   so	   much	   to	   physically	   dress	   or	   undress	   Muslim	   women	   but	   to	   bind	   their	   bodies	   to	   a	   fixed,	  
transparent	   and	   singular	   identity.	   More	   or	   less	   clothed,	   more	   or	   less	   naked,	   women’s	   bodies,	  
associated	  with	  male	  pleasure	  and	  social	   reproduction,	  must	  emit	  desirable	   information.	  Thus,	   the	  
female	  body,	  clothed	  or	  exposed,	  Muslim	  or	  Christian-­‐cum-­‐secular,	  emerges	  as	  an	  ‘objectified’	  field	  
of	   struggle,	   a	   still	   quite	   patriarchal	   modernity	   –	   secular	   or	   Islamist;	   as	   women	   are	   seen	   as	   the	  
reproducers	  of	  ideologies	  and	  transmitters	  of	  tradition	  and	  culture	  (Yuval-­‐Davis	  1993;	  Landes	  2003),	  
they	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  reproduce	  a	  specific	  law’s	  subject.	  
As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   the	   two	   leading	   cases	   decided	   at	   the	   ECHR	   that	   this	   paper	   takes	   into	  
consideration	   (Sahin	  v	  Turkey,	  2005	  and	  Dahlab	  v	  Switzerland,	  2001)	   reveal	  a	   ‘clash’	  between	   two	  
legal-­‐political	  systems,	  similar	  but	  contingently	  dissimilar.	  Both	  systems	  aspire	  to	  create	  a	  fixed	  law’s	  
subject	  through	  enforcing	  the	  rules	  of	  law.	  
                                           
1 I have chosen to use this term because I see a continuation between Christianity and the secular (Kantorowicz 
1957; Diamantides 2012). 
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In	   particular,	   the	   Sahin	   case	   (2005),	   in	   which	   a	   young	   student	   was	   forbidden	   to	   enter	   a	   Turkish	  
university	   because	   she	   was	   veiled,	   reveals	   a	   common	   view	   among	   Islamists	   that	   the	  matter	   falls	  
under	  Sharia	   law,	  which	   is	  moreover	  misrepresented	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  transparent	  code	  of	  
unalterable	   revealed	   law.	  By	   referring	   to	   the	  Refah	  Partisi	   case	   (Refah	  Partisi	   v	   Turkey,	   2003),	   the	  
judges	  stated	  that	  Shari’a	  law	  would	  oblige	  people	  to	  obey	  static	  rules	  imposed	  for	  religious	  reasons.	  
However,	  the	  pluralist	  legal	  system	  called	  for	  by	  the	  Refah	  Party	  was	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  unique	  
Sharia	  law	  proposed	  by	  Islamist	  groups/parties.	  In	  the	  case,	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  pluralist	  legal	  system	  
was	  compounded	  by	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  pluralistic	  practice	  of	  veiling:	  the	  blindness	  of	  the	  ECHR	  to	  this	  
pluralism	   of	   intentions	   and	   of	   performative	   outcomes	   of	   the	   act	   of	   wearing	   a	   veil,	   as	   with	   any	  
codified	  human	  action,	  reveals	  that,	  instead	  of	  a	  clash	  of	  civilisations,	  what	  we	  really	  have	  is	  a	  clash	  
of	  two	  imperialistic-­‐universalistic	  discourses:	  the	  triumphant	  secular	  discourse	  of	  a	  world	  that	  is	  re-­‐
humanised	  through	  human	  rights	  (not	  too	  far	  from	  the	  Christian	  version	  in	  which	  a	  particular	  man	  is	  
re-­‐born	   as	   a	   universal	   human	   through	   baptism)	   and	   the	   reactive	   Islamist	   discourse.	   Both	   systems	  
aspire	   towards	   establishing	   a	   universalist	   law	   able	   to	   bind	   the	   subject	   to	   a	  monolithic	   and	   static	  
identity.	  While	  Islamists	  aspire	  to	  bind	  the	  entire	  world	  to	  a	  universal	  singular	  and	  fixed	  Sharia	  law,	  
in	  the	  West,	  Human	  Rights	  law	  aspires	  to	  redeem	  the	  whole	  humanity	  through	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  
human	  within	  the	  pale	  of	  the	  law.	  
To	  understand	  how	  the	  universalist	  claim	  of	  Human	  Rights	  law	  has	  created	  an	  intrinsic	  relationship	  
between	  positive	   law,	  Human	  Rights	   law	  and	  the	   ‘human’	   I	  will	   recall	  Esmeir’s	  work	   (2012)	  on	  the	  
emergence	  of	  juridical	  humanity.	  Through	  examining	  the	  history	  of	  the	  British	  protectorate	  in	  Egypt,	  
she	  reveals	  that	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  new	  positive	  law	  by	  British	  colonisers	  aimed	  to	  deliver	  humanity	  
to	   a	   people	   (supposedly)	   ‘de-­‐humanized’	   by	   previous	   barbarian	   and	   ‘backward’	   political	   and	   legal	  
systems.	  As	  humanity	  is	  delivered	  through	  the	  inscription	  of	  the	  individual	  within	  the	  pale	  of	  positive	  
law,	   the	   human	   becomes	   the	   telos	   and	   the	   theological	   end	   of	   the	   law.	   Consequently,	   the	   human	  
become	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  ‘juridical	  person’.	  Esmeir’s	  articulation	  and	  theoretical	  analysis	  allows	  
us	   to	   re-­‐think	   the	   current	   debate	   on	   human	   rights	   as	   a	   means	   of	   effective	   development;	   if	  
‘humanity’	   is	  delivered	  only	  within	  the	  pale	  of	  the	  law,	  then	  becoming	  the	  subject	  of	  human	  rights	  
can	   ensure	   both	   a	   temporal	   humanity	   and	   its	   possible	   suspension.	   Hence,	   Human	   Rights	   law	  
protects	   an	   already-­‐given-­‐human	   and	   it	   claims	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   declaration	   of	   its	   status.	  
Therefore,	  what	  transpires	  from	  Human	  Rights	   law	  is	  the	   imposition	  of	  a	  new	  universal	   law	  that	   in	  
principle	   ‘saves’	   part	   of	   humanity	  which	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   allowed	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   arrangements	   of	  
liberal	  law	  but,	  in	  reality,	  it	  reinforces	  its	  own	  absolute	  power	  and,	  as	  a	  transcendent	  Christian	  God	  
did	  before,	  it	  controls	  and	  guides	  the	  individual	  by	  creating	  a	  specific	  secular	  subject	  who	  enjoys	  the	  
abstract	  equality	  of	  a	  (supposedly)	  neutral	  secular	  state	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  law.	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In	   this	   context,	   the	  ECHR’s	  decision	  over	   the	  practice	  of	   veiling,	  which	  appears	  as	   a	  necessity	   in	   a	  
globalised	  world,	   emerges	  as	  one	  of	   the	  main	   contradictions	  of	   the	  human	   rights	  discourse	  which	  
claims	  to	  safeguard	  dignity	  for	  all.	  This	  mirrors	  a	  more	  general	  contradiction	  of	  liberalism;	  if,	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	  the	  citizen	  is	  free,	  then	  on	  the	  other,	   in	  order	  for	  these	  freedoms	  to	  be	  guaranteed,	  the	  
individual	  has	  to	  surrender	  to	  the	  police	  state.	   In	  the	  case,	   in	  order	  to	  ‘save’	  western	  values,	  some	  
personal	   rights	   of	   Muslim	   women	   and	   their	   possibility	   of	   agency	   have	   to	   be	   limited.	   Therefore,	  
although	  Human	  Rights	  law	  claims	  to	  redeem	  humanity	  through	  the	  force	  of	  the	  law,	  it	  actually	  acts	  
to	  eradicate	  cultural	  differences	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  fixed	  and	  monolithic	  secular	  law’s	  subject.	  In	  this	  
sense,	   secularism	   emerges	   not	   as	   the	   separation	   between	   private	   and	   public,	   but	   as	   the	   re-­‐
conceptualization	  of	  religious	  sensitivities	  and	  religious	  practices	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  
	  
Revealing	  paradoxes	  
The	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	   (UDHR),	  which	  arose	   from	  the	  atrocities	  of	   the	  Second	  
World	  War,	  represented	  the	  first	  expression	  of	  what	  many	  people	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  legal	  rights	  of	  
every	   human	   being.	   With	   the	   Universal	   Declaration,	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   the	   European	  
Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	   (which	  established	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	   in	  order	   to	  
enforce	  individual	  rights	  and	  freedoms)	  aimed	  to	  announce	  an	  ‘internationalization’	  of	  human	  rights	  
and	   pave	   the	   way	   for	   a	   new	   jurisdiction	   which	   would	   exist	   outside	   national	   borders	   in	   order	   to	  
protect	   individuals	  from	  the	  actions	  of	  their	  states.	  However,	  the	   latest	  ECHR	  decisions	  concerning	  
regulation	  of	  the	  female	  headscarf	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	  underlying	  values	  of	  the	  convention.	  
Leyla	   Sahin	   v	   Turkey	   (2005)	   is	   one	   of	   the	  most	   controversial	   cases	   decided	   at	   the	   ECHR.	   In	   1998,	  
Istanbul	  University	  released	  a	  circular	  prohibiting	  students	   from	  wearing	  the	  headscarf	   (along	  with	  
‘long	   beards’)	   during	   lectures	   and	   examinations.	   A	   few	   months	   later	   Sahin,	   in	   her	   fifth	   year	   of	  
medical	  school	  at	  Istanbul	  University,	  was	  denied	  access	  to	  a	  written	  examination	  because	  she	  was	  
wearing	  the	  veil	  and	  disciplinary	  measures	  were	  imposed	  as	  result	  of	  her	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  
circular.	  One	   year	   after	   that	   she	  was	   also	   suspended	   for	   six	  months	  by	   the	  Dean	  of	   the	  Cerrahpa	  
Faculty	  of	  Medicine	  for	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  demonstration	  concerning	  the	  right	  to	  wear	  the	  headscarf	  in	  
Turkey.	  As	  no	  university	  in	  the	  country	  allowed	  the	  wearing	  of	  the	  veil,	  Sahin	  was	  forced	  to	  move	  to	  
Vienna	  University	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  her	  studies.	  She	  applied	  to	  the	  Istanbul	  Administrative	  Court	  
claiming	  her	  right	  to	  wear	  the	  hijab	  in	  the	  University;	  the	  Court,	  however,	  dismissed	  her	  application.	  
On	  the	  21st	  of	   July	  1998,	  she	   lodged	  a	  complaint	  against	  the	  Turkish	  government	  claiming	  that	  the	  
ban	  on	  wearing	  the	  headscarf	  in	  higher	  education	  violated	  her	  rights	  under	  Articles	  8,9,10	  and	  14	  of	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the	   Convention	   and	   Article	   2	   of	   Protocol	   No.1.2	   The	   case	   reached	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	  
Rights	  and	  in	  November	  2005	  the	  Grand	  Chamber	  decided	  that	  the	  university’s	  refusal	  to	  allow	  her	  
to	   wear	   a	   headscarf	   did	   not	   violate	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   of	   Human	   Rights	   on	  
freedom	  of	   thought	  and	   religion	  and	  confirmed	   the	  decision	  of	   the	  Fourth	  Section	  of	   the	  Court	  of	  
June	  2004.	  
The	   ECHR’s	   decision	   was	   based	   on	   two	   main	   problematic	   assumptions:	   Sharia	   is	   a	   substantively	  
static	   and	   unchangeable	   revealed	   law	   system,	   and	   the	   values	   of	   Sharia	   law	   are	   illiberal	   and	  
incompatible	  with	  western	  secular	  democratic	  principles.	   In	   fact,	   in	   the	  case,	   the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  
felt	  the	  need	  to	  retell	  the	  master	  narrative	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  secular	  state	  in	  Turkey	  as	  has	  been	  told	  
by	   the	   official	   state	   since	   Ataturk,	   complete	   with	   references	   to	   the	   supposed	   difficulties	   in	  
convincing	  Muslim	  religious	  groups	   to	  accept	   the	  privatisation	  of	   their	   religion	   (Hallaq	  2001)	  –as	   if	  
the	  previous	  Ottoman	  ruler	  had	  been	  some	  kind	  of	  divine	  anointed	  king,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Europe	  
before	  modernity.	  It	  appeared,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  problem	  in	  Turkey	  was	  the	  existence	  of	  religious	  
extremist	  groups	  which	  demanded,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  freedom	  for	  women	  to	  wear	  the	  Islamic	  headscarf	  
in	  public	  places,	   the	  amendment	  of	   the	  anti-­‐polygamy	   law,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  
legal	   systems	   based	   on	   religious	   belonging:	   for	   this	   reason,	   based	   on	   the	   ECHR’s	   reasoning,	   the	  
measures	   adopted	   by	   the	   university	   were	   in	   line	   with	   the	   convention.	   It	   is	   not	   clear,	   however,	  
whether	  there	  were	  extremist	  Islamic	  groups	  operating	  in	  the	  University;	  how	  these	  groups	  affected	  
public	  order;	  and	   if	   the	  applicant	  had	  a	  relationship	  with	  those	  groups.	  None	  of	  these	  points	  were	  
answered	  by	  the	  Court.	  Rather,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  general	  approach	  of	  the	  Court	  sets	  forth	  a	  general	  
rule	  for	  Turkey	  which	  implies	  that,	  because	  in	  the	  country	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  is	  Muslim,	  
it	   is	  essential	  to	  ban	  the	  hijab	   in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  freedom	  of	  others,	  the	  public	  order,	  and	  the	  
principle	  of	  secularism	  and	  gender	  equality.	  However,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  history	  of	  Turkey	  and	  the	  
(supposed)	   existence	   of	   extremist	   religious	   movements	   which	   attempt	   to	   overthrow	   the	   secular	  
state,	  the	  Court	  has	  made	  a	  mistake:	  it	  “substituted	  Turkey	  for	  the	  University	  of	  Istanbul	  and	  Islam	  
for	  the	  headscarf”	  (Altiparmak	  and	  Karahanogullari	  2006,	  279).	  
To	  emphasise	  the	   impossibility	  of	  reconciling	  the	  Turkish	  Republic’s	  secular,	   liberal	  and	  democratic	  
values	   with	   ‘extremist’	   (Islamist)	   religious	  movements	   in	   Turkey,	   the	   Court	   referred	   to	   the	  Refah	  
Party,	   which	   was	   subsequently	   banned.	   Refah	   Partisi,	   an	   Islamic	   political	   party	   founded	   in	   1983,	  
participated	  in	  the	  first	  national	  election	  in	  1991	  gaining,	  in	  coalition	  with	  two	  other	  parties,	  16.9%	  
                                           
2 Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life, Article 9, Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
“Article 10 – “Article 10 – Freedom of expression “Article 14- “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” (‘European Convention on Human Rights - Convention_ 2016) 
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of	  the	  vote.	  In	  the	  following	  years,	  Refah	  gained	  growing	  consent	  until	  1998,	  when	  the	  Constitutional	  
Court	   of	   Turkey	   officially	   banned	   the	   party	   for	   violating	   the	   constitutional	   secular	   principle	   of	   the	  
separation	  between	  religion	  and	  the	  state:	   in	  2003,	   the	  ban	  was	  upheld	  by	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  
Human	   Rights.	   The	   ECHR’s	   decision	   to	   ban	   the	   party	   was	   based	   on	   the	   premise	   of	   a	   general	  
incompatibility	   of	   an	   Islamic-­‐based-­‐politico-­‐legal	   system	  with	   secular	   western	   democracy.	   In	   fact,	  
based	   on	   the	   Court’s	   reasoning,	   Refah	   was	   allegedly	   attempting	   to	   introduce	   Sharia	   law	   which	  
“would	  oblige	   individuals	   to	  obey…static	   rules	  of	   law	   imposed	  by	   the	   religion	  concerned”	   (Refah	  v	  
Turkey,	  2003	  para	  70).	  In	  the	  case,	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  concluded	  that:	  
“Sharia,	   which	   faithfully	   reflects	   the	   dogmas	   and	   divine	   rules	   laid	   down	   by	   religion,	   is	   stable	   and	  
invariable….	   Principles	   such	   as	   pluralism	   in	   the	   political	   sphere	   or	   the	   constant	   evolution	   of	   the	  
public	   freedoms	  have	  no	  place	   in	   it.	  The	  Court	  notes	  that	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  declare	  one’s	  respect	   for	  
democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  while	  at	   the	  same	  time	  supporting	  a	  regime	  based	  on	  Shari’a,	  which	  
clearly	   diverges	   from	   convention	   values,	   particularly	   with	   regard	   to	   its	   criminal	   law	   and	   criminal	  
procedure,	  its	  rules	  on	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  women	  and	  the	  way	  it	  intervenes	  in	  all	  spheres	  of	  private	  
and	   public	   life	   in	   accordance	   with	   religious	   precepts….	   Refah’s	   policy	   was	   to	   apply	   some	   sharia	  
private	  law	  rule	  to	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  population	  in	  Turkey	  [namely	  Muslim],	  within	  the	  framework	  
of	  a	  plurality	  of	  legal	  systems.	  Such	  a	  policy	  goes	  beyond	  the	  freedom	  of	  individuals	  to	  observe	  the	  
precepts	   of	   their	   religion…This	   Refah	   policy	   falls	   outside	   the	   private	   sphere	   to	  which	   Turkish	   law	  
confines	   religion	   and	   suffers	   from	   the	   same	   contradictions	   with	   the	   convention	   system	   as	   the	  
introduction	  of	  sharia”	  (para	  72	  and	  19).	  
Through	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  Refah	  case,	  the	  ECHR	  accepted	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Court	  
which	   conceived	   Sharia	   law	   as	   a	   non-­‐negotiable	   code	   whose	   authority	   lies	   outside	   the	   human	  
horizon	   and,	   certainly,	   outside	   the	   authority	   of	   a	   modern	   (nation)	   state.	   Even	   though	   groups	   of	  
people	   living	  within	   the	  European	  borders	  are	   resolving	   their	   civil	   law	  problems	  on	  sharia-­‐derived	  
solutions,	  the	  ECHR	  seems	  to	  find	  Islamic	  law	  totally	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  European	  legal	  system.	  
In	   the	   Refah	   Partisi	   case	   (2003),	   the	   Court	   also	   observed	   that	   “there	   was	   already	   an	   Islamic	  
theocratic	   regime	   under	   Ottoman	   law”	   (para	   125)	   and	   that	   this	   system	  was	   dismantled	   with	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  republican	  regime	  in	  Turkey.	  
The	  Ottoman	  Empire	  applied	  a	   legal	  system	  (the	   ‘Millet	  system’)	  based	  on	  religious	   identity	  where	  
every	  religious	  group	  responded	  to	  different	  laws	  in	  relation	  to	  family	  law	  (Shahar	  2012).	  The	  Court’s	  
ignorance	  of	  the	  Millet	  system	  is	  astonishing	  as	  well	  as	  the	  confounding	  of	  Refah	  neo-­‐Ottomanism	  
with	   Islamist	   fundamentalism	  and	   indeed,	   only	   those	   parts	   of	   Islamist	   ideology	   that	   contrast	  with	  
western	  law	  –namely	  its	  claim	  that	  the	  entirety	  of	  Sharia	  is	  revealed/positivized	  law—and	  not	  those	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which	   evoke	   their	   similarity	   –namely	   that,	   unlike	   the	   Millet	   system,	   Islamists	   call	   for	   the	  
establishment	   of	   an	   Islamic	   empire	   where	   jurisdiction	   is	   territorial.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   Court	  
confused	  Refah,	  which	  called	  for	  a	  plurality	  of	  legal	  systems,	  with	  Islamic	  fundamentalism,	  which	  call	  
for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  unique,	  fixed,	  territorial	  Sharia	  law.	  Oddly	  enough,	  in	  the	  Court’s	  view,	  a	  
political	   party	  whose	   actions	   seem	   to	   be	   aimed	   at	   introducing	   different	   religious	   legal	   systems	   in	  
relation	  to	  family	  law,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  of	  modern	  Israel,	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  association	  which	  hardly	  complies	  
with	   the	   democratic	   ideal	   that	   motivates	   the	   convention.	   Moreover,	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   true	  
distinction	  between	  personal/communitarian	  Islamic	  law	  and	  territorial/individualistic	  western	  law	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  the	  ECHR’s	  decision	  to	  dismantle	  Refah	  was	  partly	  based	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  party	  
was	  planning	  to	  set	  up	  a	  plurality	  of	  legal	  systems.	  
The	  reference	  to	  the	  Refah	  case,	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  ECHR’s	  decision	  in	  the	  Sahin	  case,	  is	  particularly	  
striking	  as	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Court’s	  ignorance	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  Islamic	  traditions	  regarding	  the	  veil	  
was	   compounded	   by	   its	   rejection	   of	   a	   plurality	   of	   legal	   systems	   within	   the	   same	   territory	   qua	  
political	  unit.	  It	  is	  clear,	  therefore,	  that	  in	  seeking	  to	  forcibly	  expose	  Turkish	  women’s’	  bodies	  to	  their	  
natural	   rights	   the	   ECHR	   was	   also	   seeking	   to	   subjugate	   them	   under	   the	   logic	   of	   singular	   state	  
sovereignty.	   As	   ever	   in	   liberalism,	   individual	   liberty	   is	   assured	   only	   together	   with	   state	   law	  
supremacy.	   In	   this	   regard,	   liberals	   and	   Islamists	   are	   on	   the	   same	   side	   as	   both	   aim	   at	   creating	   a	  
universal(ist)	   law	  able	  to	  bind	  the	   individual	  to	  a	  fixed	  and	  monolithic	   identity	  (Diamantides	  2012).	  
What	  is	  not	  on	  their	  side	  is	  the	  historically	  documented	  legal	  pluralism	  of	  Muslim-­‐majority	  societies:	  
in	  fact,	  in	  Islamic	  history,	  political	  and	  legal	  powers	  were	  always	  separated	  and	  in	  continuous	  need	  of	  
negotiation	   (Hallaq	   2001;	   2002;	   2005).	   But	   while,	   in	   the	   West,	   law	   was	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	  
Pope/king/sovereign	  state,	  in	  Muslim	  medieval	  majority	  societies	  Sharia	  was	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  scholars	  
who	  were	  accustomed	  to	  adjudicating	   legal	  cases	  within	  the	   limit	  of	   the	   four	  main	   (Sunni)	  schools	  
(Elias	  2010;	  Hallaq	  2001;	  Diamantides	  2012).	  
In	   this	   context,	   Diamantides’	   examination	   (2012),	   which	   takes	   into	   consideration	   the	   medieval	  
origins	  of	  the	  Islamic	  legal	  system	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  western,	  canon	  legal	  system,	  along	  with	  Nancy’s	  
theory	   of	   a	   ‘monotheist	  model	   of	   social	   organization’(2003),	   is	   particularly	   revealing.	   In	   fact,	   this	  
framework	   allows	   the	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   two	   structurally	   similar,	   but	   contingently	   dissimilar,	  
legal	  systems	  of	  religious	  origins:	  while	  the	  comparison	  reveals	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  power	  to	  make	  
law	  act	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  God’s	  supreme	  power,	  only	  in	  the	  ‘West’	  was	  this	  fully	  articulated	  with	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  sovereignty.	  If	  in	  the	  West	  centralisation	  and	  sovereignty	  eventually	  
helped	  to	  produce	  the	  ‘nation-­‐state’,	  in	  Muslim-­‐majority	  societies	  the	  relative	  freedom	  of	  judges	  and	  
jurists	   and	   the	  de	   facto	   and	  de	   jure	   plurality	   of	   schools	  which	   reflected	   local	   cultures,	  meant	   less	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state	   legitimacy	   and	   a	   “deficient	   sovereignty	   model”	   (Diamantides	   2012,	   12)	   which	   arguably	  
rendered	  the	  Muslim	  world	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  western	  expansionism.	  Thus,	  the	  difference	  concerns	  
mostly	  the	  ‘deficient	  sovereignty’	  and	  legal	  authority	  of	  traditional	  Muslim	  government	  and	  how	  this	  
was	  ‘corrected’	  by	  colonialism	  and,	  ironically,	  Islamist	  nationalists.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that,	  
on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   West	   conceives	   a	   universal,	   abstract	   identity	   valid	   for	   everyone	   which	   is	  
historically	   tied	   to	   Christianity	   and	   was	   exported	   to	   Muslim-­‐majority	   societies	   during	   the	  
colonisation	   period,	   while	   on	   the	   other,	   Islamists	   respond	   by	   trying	   to	   change	   the	   content	   but	  
maintain	  the	  same	  Christian/liberal/secular	  western	  structure	  of	  one	  universal	   law	  imposed	  by	  the	  
appropriate	   authority.	   In	   fact,	   what	   Islamists	   are	   seeking	   is	   not	   the	   ‘true’,	   ‘pure’	   Islam,	   typical	   of	  
Medina,	  where	  the	  law	  was	  made	  locally	  and	  reflected	  the	  plurality	  of	  cultures	  of	  the	  Umma,	  namely	  
an	   Islamic	   community,	   but	   a	   law	   that	   reinforces	   the	   central	   political	   power	   by	   binding	   the	  
community	  in	  a	  singular	  all-­‐encompassing	  legal	  code	  as	  well	  as	  a	  ‘national’	  ‘Muslim’	  identity’.	  
Therefore,	  the	  veil	  emerges	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  contrast	  between	  two	  versions	  of	  sovereignty,	  that	  of	  
European	  imperialism	  and	  that	  of	  Islamist	  nationalists	  who	  aim	  to	  create	  a	  singular	  Muslim	  identity	  
by	   reducing	   Islamic	   law	   into	  a	  monolithic	  codified	   legal	   system.	  Although	   the	  veil	   is	  not	  an	   Islamic	  
symbol	   but	   rather	   a	   pre-­‐Islamic	   custom	   (Ahmed	   1992;	   El	   Guindi	   1999;	   Gabriel	   and	  Hannan	   2013;	  
Bomeman	  2014;	  Mernissi	  1991),	   the	  compulsory	  veiling	  promoted	  by	  contemporary	  power-­‐hungry	  
Islamist	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  compulsory	  un-­‐veiling	  proposed	  by	  many	  western	  and	  non-­‐western	  
countries,	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  attempt	  to	  symbolically	  forge	  a	  common	  fixed	  and	  monolithic	  (national)	  
identity	  through	  women’s	  body:	  both	  (patriarchal)	  regimes	  aim	  at	  legally	  regulating	  and	  controlling	  
women’s	  attire	  by	  inscribing	  women’s	  bodies	  as	  monolithic	  symbols	  of	  cultural	  belonging	  and	  not	  as	  
subjects	  of	  history.	   In	   fact,	   the	   female	   figure	  and/or	  dress	   code	  are	   common	  collective	  group	  and	  
also	  nationalist	  symbols.	  
	  	   “The	   Muslim	   family	   offered	   a	   clear	   and	   easily	   identifiable	   starting	   point	   for	   implanting	   a	  
strong	  	   sense	   of	   faith,	   identity,	   values	   […]	  Women	   and	   the	   family	   have	   traditionally	   been	  
regarded	  as	  the	  culture	  bearer.	  Contemporary	  Islamic	  revivalism	  has	  fostered	  new	  changes	  
and	  concerns	  that	  Islam	  will	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  a	  forced	  return	  to	  the	  veil	  […]	  As	  a	  result,	  any	  
attempt	  to	  change	  these	  customs	  is	  simply	  dismissed	  as	  an	  attack	  of	  the	  Islamic	  idea	  under	  
the	  influence	  of	  the	  west”	  (Esposito	  2005,	  236–7).	  
In	   this	   connection,	   the	   current	   obsession	   with	   the	  Muslim	   veil,	   shared	   by	   western	   human	   rights	  
activists	  and	  Islamists,	  as	  revealed	  in	  many	  polemical	  debates,	  acts	  to	  hide	  the	  anxiety	  produced	  by	  
the	   imposition	  of	  one	  way	  of	  secularized	  monotheism	  over	  another	  whereas	  the	  veil	  emerges	  as	  a	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symbol	   of	   the	   contest	   between	   two	   versions	   of	   sovereignty,	   that	   of	   the	   European	   imperialist	   and	  
that	  of	  the	  Islamist	  nationalists.	  
When	   the	  western	   and	  eastern	  worlds	  meet,	   the	   internal	   incompleteness	   becomes	   apparent:	   this	  
develops	  a	  mechanism	  of	  defence	  and	  attachment	  to	  their	  respective	  legal	  systems.	  In	  essence,	  the	  
so	  called	  ‘clash	  of	  civilizations’	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  anxiety	  over	  the	  condition	  of	  incompleteness	  
between	   the	   two	   dogmatic	   (desired)	   legal	   systems	   and	   their	   own	   internal	   shortcomings:	   this	  
developed	   on	   both	   sides	   a	   mechanism	   of	   defence	   and	   attachment	   to	   their	   respective	   law	  
(Diamantides	  2012).	  In	  fact,	  both,	  fundamentalist	  Christian	  and	  Muslim	  legal	  scholars	  are	  prompted	  
by	   the	  desire	   for	  a	  positive	   law	   that	  can	  guarantee	  a	   social	  order	  and	   facilitate	  a	  centralised	  state	  
control.	  Henceforth,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  tension	  between	  Sharia	  law	  as	  invoked	  by	  Islamists	  and	  western	  
human	   rights	  discourse	   is	  misleading:	   there	   is	   only	   a	   clash	  between	   two	   forms	  of	  universalist	   and	  
imperialistic	   legal	   system	   (Diamantides	   2006;	   2012),	   one	   triumphant,	   the	   other	   aspiring:	   the	  
European	   one	   and	   the	   Islamist	   ‘fixed	   codified	   Sharia	   law’	   model	   to	   be	   implemented	   by	   the	  
appropriate	   hierarchical	   authority	  which	   is,	   in	   turn,	   the	   exact	  mirror	   of	  what	   they	   formally	   reject	  
(Tripp	  1996;	  George	  1996).	  Both	  are	  temporally	  conjoined	  in	  modernity.	  Thus,	  the	  passionate	  debate	  
over	  the	  hijab	  is	  a	  fake	  one:	  the	  veil	  has	  become	  a	  visible	  symbol,	  a	  mirror,	  of	  a	  clash	  between	  two	  
legal	  systems,	  similar	  but	  contingently	  dissimilar.	  
The	  Sahin	  case,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  judicial	  decisions	  over	  the	  practice	  of	  veiling,	  confirms	  that	  the	  
historically	  Christian	  concept	  of	  universal	  natural	  law	  –subject	  to	  exceptions	  under	  equally	  
universalist	  concepts	  of	  just	  war–	  has	  made	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  legal	  systems	  (that	  is,	  law	  beyond	  the	  
territorial	  model)	  inconceivable’.	  The	  western	  incapacity	  to	  think	  juridical	  plurality	  is	  inherited	  from	  
western	  medieval	  legal	  origins	  and	  the	  consequent	  strength	  of	  the	  territorial	  ‘nation-­‐state’:	  western	  
law	  is	  generally	  considered	  to	  emanate	  from	  political	  authority	  (Kantorowicz	  1957).	  This	  ‘ideology	  of	  
the	  powerful’	  has	  rarely	  questioned	  its	  foundations.	  
Structurally,	  the	  model	  of	  a	  Human	  Rights	  Charter,	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  which	  the	  ECHR	  can	  liberate	  
individuals	   by	   banning	   veils	   and	   political	   parties,	   would	   not	   surprise	   a	   medieval	   Pope	   acting	   as	  
universal	   arbiter	   of	   a	   universal	   law	   that	   ‘saves’	   humanity	   by	   subjugating	   particular	   traditions	   to	  
European	  power.	  The	  sacrality	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  law,	  based	  on	  abstract	  equality,	  was	  exported	  outside	  
European	  borders	  during	   the	   colonial	   era	  as	   a	  universally	   valid	   rational	   system.	  Then,	   in	   the	  post-­‐
colonial	   period,	   the	   universalist	   secular/Christian	   positive	   law	   was	   translated	   into	   another	  
universalist	   Christian/secular	   law	   called	   Human	   Rights.	   The	   Muslim	   female	   veil	   embarrasses	   this	  
universality.	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The	  ‘humane’	  subject	  of	  law	  
The	  universality	  of	  human	   rights	   is	  often	   conceived	  as	   the	  ethical	  western	  project	  of	   ‘humanizing’	  
the	   world:	   this	   is,	   at	   least,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   West	   often	   portrays	   itself	   in	   opposition	   to	   an	  
incompatible	  backward	  and	  un-­‐democratic	   Islamic	  world,	   as	  highlighted,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	  Sahin	  
case	  (Sahin	  v	  Turkey,	  2005).	  However,	  while	  delivering	  humanity,	  Human	  Rights	  law	  shapes	  a	  specific	  
law’s	  subject	  who	  is	  intrinsically	  bounded	  to	  the	  law.	  
To	   understand	   how	   Human	   Rights	   law	   as	   universal	   system	   has	   created	   a	   relationship	   between	  
(secular/western/positive)	  law	  and	  its	  (‘humane’/Christian/secular)	  subject,	  it	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  recall	  
Samera	  Esmeir’s	  work	  (2012)	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  juridical	  humanity.	  She	  recounts	  the	  story	  of	  the	  
British	   protectorate	   in	   Egypt	   (1882-­‐1956)	   and	   the	   consequent	   encounter	   between	   two	   different	  
political,	   social	  and	   legal	   systems.	  Esmeir	   reveals	   that	   the	   imposition	  of	   the	  new,	  modern,	  positive	  
law	  by	  the	  British	  colonizer	  was	  a	  precise	  project	  of	  colonisation	  which	  presupposed	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
the	  human	  in	  the	  law	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  subjugation,	  able	  to	  eliminate	  the	  past	  in	  the	  name	  of	  an	  
eternal	  present.	  The	  new	  legal	  reforms,	  alongside	  the	  adoption	  of	  western	  positive	  law,	  claimed	  to	  
deliver	   Egyptians	   from	   their	   ‘inhumane’	   existence	   under	   a	   ‘despotic’,	   ‘lawless’	   and	   ‘barbaric’	   pre-­‐
colonial	  past.	  In	  order	  to	  deliver	  humanity,	  the	  new	  law	  confined	  the	  past	  to	  a	  place	  unrelated	  to	  the	  
present:	  this	  ‘absolute	  now’	  created	  not	  only	  the	  ‘human’	  but	  also	  the	  ‘inhumane’	  backwardness	  of	  
what	   preceded	   it.	   The	   rejection	   of	   the	   past	   and	   the	   repetition	   of	   textbooks	   in	   and	   for	   the	  
present3	  were	  necessary	   to	  create	  a	   rupture	  with	   the	  past	   legal	   tradition:	   in	   fact,	   the	   repetition	  of	  
textbooks	   “of	  what	  was	   circulating	   in	   the	  present…	  did	  not	  engender	   continuity	  with	   the	  past	  but	  
rather	   homogenized	   the	   present.	   The	   authority	   of	   positive	   law	  was	   rearticulated	   by	   these	   acts	   of	  
repetition	  on	  the	  present	  and	  in	  the	  present”(Esmeir	  2012,	  58).	  Consequently,	  Egypt	  witnessed	  a	  loss	  
of	  traditional	  authority	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  new	  authority	  embedded	   in	  the	  obedience	  to	  a	  universal,	  
positive,	  fixed	  legal	  order.	  
Hence,	  the	  introduction	  of	  positive	  law,	  a	  historicist	  practice	  which	  engenders	  the	  presentist	  power	  
of	   ‘humanizing’	   ‘de-­‐humanized’	  people,	  was	  a	   legal	  temporal	  force	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  colonial	  
power	   operation	   and	   signified	   “the	   abandonment	   of	   substantive	   concepts	   of	   justice	   and	   their	  
replacement	   with	   proceduralist	   and	   formal	   ones”(Douzinas,	   2000,	   10).	  Thus,	   the	   law	   becomes	  
strictly	  bound	  to	  state	  power	  and	  the	  human	  has	  become	  chained	  to	  the	  universal	  power	  of	  the	  law	  
because	   law	   itself	  has	  delivered	  humanity.	   In	  Esmeir’s	  analysis,	   the	   juridical	   subject	  coincides	  with	  
the	   human	   because	   law	   locates	   the	   human	   as	   a	   product	   of	   the	   law	   itself.	   For	   her	   the	   law	  
incorporates	  the	  ‘human’	  by	  claiming	  authorship	  and	  source	  to	  be	  human;	  by	  rendering	  the	  human	  
                                           
3 On repetition of symbols in the nation-state see also (Anderson 1991) 
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the	   theological	   end	   of	   the	   law,	   and	   by	   defining	   the	   human	   according	   to	   the	   law.	  Thus,	   with	   the	  
colonial	  project	  humanity	   is	  no	  longer	  a	  category	  of	  birth,4	  but	  a	   juridical	  category	  that	  defines	  the	  
legal	  subject	  itself	  as	  human/inhumane.	  As	  ‘man	  is	  not	  born	  but	  made’	  (Pagden	  1986,	  1),	  humanity	  
has	  become	  the	  telos	  of	  the	  new	  modern	  positive	  law	  which	  is	  the	  prerequisite	  for	  a	  new	  universal	  
humanity.	   The	   principle	   advocating	   a	   government	   of	   laws	   and	   not	   of	   men	   was	   central	   to	   the	  
operations	  of	  the	  colonial	  state	  in	  Egypt.	  However,	  by	  defining	  and	  delivering	  humanity	  through	  law,	  
the	   British	   never	   succeeded	   in	   determining	   the	   transition	   from	   pre-­‐human	   to	   human	   or	   from	  
violence	   to	  non-­‐violence;	   since	   the	   law	  delivers	  humanity,	   it	   continues	   to	   contain	   the	   inhuman.	   In	  
essence,	  by	  making	  possible	  humanization	  through	  the	  inscription	  of	  the	  individual	  within	  the	  pale	  of	  
positive	   law,	   British	   officials	   determined	   also	   its	   ‘dehumanization’,	   namely	   a	   subject	   outside	   the	  
border	   of	   positive	   law:	  moreover,	   as	   law	   confers	   humanity,	   exclusion	   from	   the	   law	   results	   in	   the	  
practice	  of	  dehumanisation.	  
Therefore,	   in	  colonial	  Egypt,	   law	  became	  “a	  technology	  of	  colonial	  rule	  and	  modern	  relationship	  of	  
bondage”(Esmeir	  2012,	  285):	   it	  did	  not	  only	  deliver	  humanity,	  but	   it	  also	  assured	  total	  domination	  
through	  functional,	  utilitarian	  violence.	  In	  fact,	  the	  new	  legal	  reforms	  established	  a	  new	  relationship	  
with	   the	  non-­‐human	  and	  re-­‐established	  a	  new	  subjugation	  to	   law	  and	  violence.	  While,	  on	   the	  one	  
hand,	   the	  British	   imposed	   ‘humane’	   legal	   reforms	  such	  as	   the	  abolishment	  of	   the	  use	  of	   the	  whip,	  
the	   abrogation	   of	   corvée	   labour,	   and	   (significantly)	   the	   banning	   of	   the	   veil,	   on	   the	   other,	   they	  
established	   a	   number	   of	   exceptional	   rules	   in	   order	   to	   suppress	   and	   punish	   political	   activism	   and	  
banditry.	   Hence,	   in	   the	   colonial	   period,	   positive	   legal	   order	   emerges	   as	   productive	   of	   a	   specific	  
relationship	   between	   law’s	   idealized	   humanity	   and	   factualized	   violent	   measures:	   “the	   idealized	  
stance	  (a	  technique	  of	  purification)	  enabled	  the	  British	  to	  turn	  law’s	  ideals	  of	  humanity	  into	  violent	  
weapons	  aimed	  at	  protecting	  their	  purified	  ideals”	  (Esmeir	  2012,	  243).	  Through	  the	  consolidation	  of	  
a	   regime	   of	   private	   property	   in	   which	   ‘absolute	   khedival	   rights’5	   were	   substituted	   with	   ‘absolute	  
private	  property	  rights’,	  law	  becomes	  the	  new	  technology	  of	  management:	  in	  this	  sense,	  “it	  was	  the	  
colonial	   iteration	   between	   the	   West	   and	   the	   Muslim	   world,	   more	   than	   their	   khedival	   history	   of	  
sovereign	  power	  that	  corresponded	  to	  the	  particular	  meanings	  and	  operations	  of	  sovereign	  power	  
that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   claimed	   to	   have	   overcome”(Esmeir	   2012,	   202).	   Therefore,	   while	   the	   British	  
aimed	   to	   eliminate	   the	   arbitrary,	   non-­‐instrumental	   khedival	   legal	   system,	   they	   established	   an	  
arbitrary	   distinction	   between	   ‘human’,	   utilitarian,	   colonial	   violence	   and	   ‘inhumane’	   pre-­‐colonial	  
violence	   (Esmeir	   2012).	   The	   impossibility	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   ‘arbitrary	   cruelty’	   and	  
                                           
4 Differently, as Fanon (1967) argues that humanity is not something that can be delivered or taken away. 
5 The Khedival-legal system was the Ottoman legal order grounded in the tradition of Islamic law. For an 
overview of the Ottoman legal system (Hunter 1984) 
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‘productive	  cruelty’	   reveals	  all	  of	   the	   law’s	  violence	  as	  arbitrary	  and	  signals	  a	  collapse	  of	  ends	   into	  
means.	   In	   colonial	   Egypt,	   law	   did	   not	   emerge	   as	   an	   instrument	   aiming	   at	   protecting,	   but	   as	   the	  
vehicle	  of	  a	  ‘functional’	  and	  ‘repressive’	  violence	  and	  domination.	  
The	  universalist	  claim	  of	  positive	  law	  can	  now	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  human	  rights	  
discourse:	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   contemporary	   human	   rights	   are	   based	   on	   few	   main	   assumptions	  
which	  echoes	   the	   assumption	  of	   positive	   law	  exported	  during	   the	   last	   century:	   firstly,	   despite	   the	  
difficulties	   involved	   in	   organizing	   pluralistic	   societies,	   the	   liberal	   democratic	   positivized	   order	   is	  
considered	  able	  to	  produce	  the	  most	  equitable	  outcomes:	  therefore,	  positive	  law	  and	  then	  Human	  
Rights	  law	  are	  conceived	  as	  a	  global	  formula	  (Esmeir	  2006).	  Secondly,	  gender	  equality	  is	  defined	  in	  
global	  terms,	  consequently,	  the	  solution	  offered	  by	  human	  rights	  must	  be	  global,	  universal:	  through	  
human	  rights’	  lenses,	  “women	  around	  the	  world	  can	  be	  considered	  one	  indivisible	  group,	  historically	  
silenced	  and	  oppressed	  by	  men”(Mark	  van	  Hoecke	  2016,	  49).6	  Moreover,	  as	  Esmeir	   (2006)	  argues,	  
“Human	  Rights	  law,	  like	  modern	  law	  more	  generally,	  aspires	  to	  name,	  define,	  call	  into	  being,	  redeem	  
the	   human”(1544).	   Since	   the	   legal	   subject	   is	   a	   human	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   a	   human-­‐yet-­‐to-­‐
become,	   becoming	   the	   subject	   of	   human	   rights	   can	   ensure	   both	   a	   temporal	   humanity	   and	   its	  
possible	   suspension.	   In	   fact,	   Human	   Rights	   law,	   as	   positive	   law	   before,	   aspires	   to	   constitute	   a	  
‘human’	   who	   would	   otherwise	   remain	   non-­‐human	   and	   protects	   an	   already-­‐given	   human	   while	  
claiming	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   declaration	   of	   its	   status.	   If	   it	   is	   true	   that	   there	   is	   no	   legal	   system	  
without	   a	   legal	   subject,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	  human	   rights	  without	   the	   ‘human’.	   In	  
other	  words,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   have	   a	   concept	   of	   human	   rights	  without	   a	   definition	   of	  what	   is	  
‘human’	   and,	   along	  with	   it,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   define	   humanity	   without	   defining	   the	   ‘pre-­‐human’	   or	  
‘non-­‐human’.	  
If,	   during	   the	   last	   century,	   the	   subjects	   of	   human	   rights	   were	   specific	   people	  who	   had	   been	   ‘de-­‐
humanized’	  by	  their	  oppressive	  and	  ‘backward’	  regimes,	  and	  were	  thus	  waiting	  to	  be	  ‘re-­‐humanized’	  
through	   their	   inscription	   within	   the	   pale	   of	   (positive)	   law,	   nowadays,	   the	   western-­‐constructed	  
‘political	  failure’	  of	  third	  world	  countries	  has	  defined	  all	  those	  who	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  model	  of	  
Christian/secular	  subject	  as	  the	   ‘yet-­‐to-­‐become-­‐fully-­‐human’	  of	   international	   law.	  As	  Esmeir	   (2006)	  
argues,	  
	  “becoming	   subjects	   of	   human	   rights	   ensures	   recognition	   of	   their	   (temporary)	   humanity	   and	   its	  
(possible)	  suspension.	  A	  person	  is,	  therefore,	  at	  once	  a	  human	  and	  yet-­‐to-­‐be-­‐human,	  a	  member	  of	  
universal	  human	  kind	  and	  its	  dehumanized	  figure.	  This	  contradiction	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  failure	  in	  
                                           
6 It is important to point out that long before human rights discourse was concerned with the idea of gender 
equality positive law was concerned with the idea of abstract equality. 
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logic	   but	   is	   related	   to	   the	   law’s	   aspiration	   to	   call	   into	   existence,	   and	   by	   so	   doing	   to	   constitute	   a	  
human	   who	   would	   otherwise	   remain	   non-­‐human…the	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   law’s	   power	   of	  
constituting	   humanity	   carries	   the	   risk	   of	   erasing	   all	   other	   humanities,	   not	   only	   in	   imposing	   its	  
particular	  vision	  of	  humanity	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  crucially,	  in	  erasing	  their	  past	  existence	  before	  the	  
law’s	  intervention”	  (1547).	  
Therefore,	   conceptualizing	   the	  human	  as	   a	   legal	   status	   allows	   a	   double	  movement:	   dehumanizing	  
and	  re-­‐humanizing.	  Moreover,	  because	  any	  government	  can	  violate	  one’s	   legal	  status	  as	  a	  human,	  
there	   is	   always	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   ‘de-­‐humanized’:	   in	   this	   sense,	   the	   specific	   concept	   of	   a	   human	  
inscribed	  within	  the	  pale	  of	  the	  law	  emerges	  as	  extremely	  fragile	  and	  paradoxical.	  In	  fact,	  although	  
Human	  Rights	   law	   is	   centred	  upon	  a	   liberal	   concept	  of	   the	   individual,	   it	   increasingly	   aims	  at	   state	  
control	  of	  human	  conduct	  and	  the	  individual’s	  physical	  being,	  the	  body,	  even	  though	  it	  calls	  for	  the	  
protection	   of	   minorities,	   as	   revealed	   in	   the	   current	   debate	   over	   the	   headscarf.	   Thus,	   “from	  
identifying	   the	   human	   individual	   in	   various	   ways	   to	   demanding	   that	   the	   state	   take	   charge	   of	  
regulating	  her	  conduct,	  the	  liberationist	  ideal	  of	  human	  rights	  discourse	  has	  born	  a	  state	  increasingly	  
regulatory	  and	  punitive”(Mark	  van	  Hoecke	  2016,	  45).	  This,	  however,	   clashes	  with	  other	  models	  of	  
social	  organization,	  where	  communities	  organize	  themselves	  according	  to	  different	  standards’.	  
	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  forced	  un-­‐veiling	  of	  ‘inhumanely-­‐treated’	  Muslim	  women	  in	  order	  to	  re-­‐veil	  them	  
with	   the	   legal	  mask	   of	   a	   state-­‐protected	   human	  à	   l’occidentale	   acquires	   an	   emblematic	   status:	   it	  
reveals	  that	  the	  regulation	  of	  Muslim	  women’s	  bodies	  is	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  intrinsic	  contradiction	  in	  
liberalism	   and	   human	   rights	   discourse	   in	   general	   and	   the	   particular	   violence	   this	   contradiction	  
entails	   for	   non-­‐western	   traditions	   of	   law	   and	   politics	   in	   particular.	   If,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   liberalism	  
justifies	  itself	  by	  claiming	  a	  separation	  between	  the	  spiritual	  and	  the	  temporal,	  the	  private	  and	  the	  
public,	   then	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  private	   life	  of	   the	   individual	  has	  become	  extremely	   regulated:	  
hence,	  the	  western/abstract	  citizen	  is	  free	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  compelled.	  
Significantly,	   some	   individuals	   are	   interpolated	  more	   than	  others,	   especially	  when	   their	   behaviour	  
indicates	  that	  there	  are	  alternative	  traditions	  of	   individuation	  and	  subjectification	  to	  that	  of	   liberal	  
positive	   law	  and	  human	  rights.	  This	   is	  well	  shown	  in	  the	  Dahlab	  case	  (Dahlab	  v	  Switzerland,	  2001),	  
decided	  at	  the	  ECHR.	  Ms.	  Dahlab	  was	  a	  teacher	  in	  a	  primary	  school	  in	  Switzerland.	  After	  a	  period	  of	  
deep	  spiritual	  searching	  she	  converted	  to	  Islam	  and	  started	  to	  wear	  the	  hijab.	  She	  wore	  the	  veil	  for	  
four	  years;	  during	  that	  time	  there	  was	  no	  complaint	  from	  her	  young	  students	  or	  their	  families.	  When	  
students	  asked	  her	  why	  she	  was	  wearing	   long	  clothing	  and	  covering	  her	  head,	  she	  used	  to	  answer	  
that	  it	  was	  to	  keep	  her	  ears	  warm	  (Dahlab	  v	  Switzerland,	  456).	  After	  four	  years,	  an	  inspector	  visited	  
the	  school	  and	  reported	  that	  Ms	  Dahlab	  was	  wearing	  ‘Muslim’	  garments.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  Director	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General	  of	  Public	  Education	  becomes	  involved.	  He	  tried	  to	  mediate	  with	  Ms	  Dahlab	  and	  asked	  her	  to	  
remove	  the	  veil:	  when	  Dahlab	  refused,	  alleging	  her	  right	  to	  wear	  the	  headscarf,	  she	  was	  dismissed.	  
She	  appealed	   the	  decision	   in	   the	  Swiss	  Court,	  which	  upheld	   the	  decision	  of	   the	  School.	   The	  Court	  
found	   odd	   the	   request	   of	  Ms	   Dahlab	   against	   the	   norm	   of	   a	   Christian	   country	   and	   prohibited	   the	  
wearing	  of	  the	  headscarf	  based	  on	  a	  law	  that	  explicitly	  prohibits	  the	  wearing	  of	  religious	  symbols	  in	  
public	   schools.	   The	  domestic	   court	  pointed	  out	   that	   it	  was	   impossible	   for	   the	   law	   to	   cover	   all	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  state	  schools’	  teachers	  and	  that	  some	  margin	  was	  allowed	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	  
conduct	   would	   be	   regarded	   by	   the	   average	   citizen	   as	   being	   of	   minor	   importance.	   Ms	   Dahlab	  
appealed	  at	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  which,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Swiss	  Court,	  pointed	  out	  the	  
importance	   of	  weighting	   ‘the	   requirements	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   and	   liberties	   of	   others	  
against	  the	  conduct	  of	  which	  the	  applicant	  stood	  accused’	  (Dahlab	  v	  Switzerland,	  449):	  suddenly,	  the	  
right-­‐holder	  woman	  becomes	   the	  accused.	   In	   fact,	   instead	  of	  weighing	   the	   rights	  of	  Ms	  Dahlab	   to	  
wear	  the	  hijab	  with	  the	  rights	  and	  freedom	  of	  others,	  the	  EHCR	  presented	  an	  (imaginary)	  undefined	  
‘other’	  in	  need	  of	  protection	  from	  the	  ‘wrongdoing’	  of	  Ms.	  Dahlab.7	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  applicant	  was	  
working	  in	  a	  public	  institution,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  the	  request	  of	  the	  school	  was	  admissible	  under	  
the	  principle	  of	  ‘state	  neutrality’.	  
But	  the	  most	  controversial	  point	  of	  the	  decision	  is	  the	  accusation	  of	  proselytism	  moved	  against	  Ms	  
Dahlab.	   In	   fact,	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   case,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   which	   kind	   of	   ‘bad	   influence’	   or	  
‘proselytizing	  effects’	  Ms	  Dahlab	  was	  exercising	  on	  ‘vulnerable	  children’	  since	  she	  did	  not	  even	  tell	  
them	  that	  she	  had	  converted	  to	   Islam.	  Many	  of	   those	  children	  were	  probably	  exposed	  to	  religious	  
rituals	   by	   parents,	   relatives	   and	   other	   figures	   of	   authority.	   Hence,	   how	   can	   we	   prove	   that	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  Ms	  Dahlab	  would	  defy	  the	  authority	  figures	  of	  a	  child’s	  life?	  Moreover,	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  
we	  live	  in	  a	  pluralistic	  society,	  how	  can	  we	  justify	  the	  fact	  that,	  when	  the	  individual	  works	  in	  public	  
places	  she	  has	  to	  comply	  with	  ‘liberal’	  values?8	  If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  wearing	  a	  hijab	  creates	  tensions	  and	  
conflicts,	  as	  stated	   in	  the	  Strasbourg	  sentences,	   the	  parties	  should	  take	  measures	  to	  reconcile	  and	  
not	  to	  prohibit	  group	  manifestations.	  
The	  weakness	  of	  the	  accusation	  of	  proselytism	  moved	  against	  Ms	  Dahlab	  is	  evident	  when	  comparing	  
the	   case	  with	  Kokkinakis	   v	   Greece	   (1993),	   decided	   at	   the	   ECHR.	   The	   case	   involved	   two	   Jehovah’s	  
Witnesses	  who	  were	  charged	  with	  the	  criminal	  offence	  of	  proselytizing	  after	  knocking	  on	  the	  door	  of	  
                                           
7 It is worth remembering that during the four year period in which Ms Dahlab wore the hijab, there was no 
objection to the quality of her work. Moreover, it clearly appears that the applicant never tried to have any kind 
of advantage or proselytising action related to her religious belief. For an interesting analysis of the case see 
(Bahia Tahzib-Lie 2004, 473–83) 
8 In Kokkinakis v Greece (Application 14307/88) ECHR 25 May 1993 A. No. 260, para 31and Manoussakis and 
Others v. Greece, Application No. 18748/91ECHR 26 Sept. 1996, IV RJD, para.44, the ECHR clearly stated 
that pluralism is an important feature in a democratic society. 
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diverse	  Greek	  Orthodox	  priests	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  convince	  them	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  their	  religion.9	  Oddly	  
enough,	   for	   the	   ECHR,	   Ms	   Dahlab’s	   clothing	   represented	   a	   greater	   threat	   to	   liberty	   than	   Mr	  
Kokkinakis’s	  attempt	  to	  proselytize:	  hence,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  woman,	  by	  wearing	  certain	  clothes,	  
wants	  to	  hide	  her	  body	  and	  her	  religion	  from	  her	  students,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  a	  man	  knocks	  at	  the	  
door	  of	  an	  orthodox	  priest	  trying	  to	  convince	  him	  of	  his	  truth.	  The	  former	  is	  considered	  by	  the	  ECHR	  
as	  a	  form	  of	  proselytism	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  not.	  Hence,	  although	  the	  Strasburg	  Court	  has	  taken	  into	  
consideration	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality	   and	   necessity,	   it	   has	   applied	   them	   inconsistently.	  
While,	   for	   the	   Court,	   it	   was	   not	   necessary	   to	   regulate	   proselytizing	   actions	   such	   as	   the	   one	  
committed	  by	  Kokkinakis	  in	  a	  country	  where	  this	  action	  has	  been	  considered	  illegal	  by	  the	  domestic	  
court,	  in	  Switzerland,	  removing	  a	  woman	  from	  the	  public	  space	  because	  she	  has	  started	  to	  wear	  the	  
veil	   has	  been	  presented	  by	   the	  ECHR	  as	  a	  necessity	   to	   save	   the	  principle	  of	   ‘state	  neutrality’.	   The	  
principles	  of	  proportionality	  and	  necessity,	  as	  applied	  by	  the	  ECHR,	  do	  not	  restrain	  western/liberal	  
paradoxes;	   rather,	   they	   allow	   them	   to	   be	   perpetrated.	   In	   fact,	   if	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   ultimately	   a	  
promise	  of	  predictability	  the	  very	  idea	  that	  one	  has	  to	  wait	  and	  see	  how	  the	  Court	  will	  in	  each	  case	  
employ	   the	   tests	   of	   proportionality	   and	   necessity	   is	   paradoxical.	   Therefore,	   what	   transpires	   from	  
those	   decisions	   is	   that,	   in	   general,	   in	   order	   for	   the	   ‘sovereign	   nation-­‐state’	   to	   remain	   strong	   and	  
unified,	   certain	   performances	   of	   some	   rights	   have	   to	   be	   limited.	   In	   the	   event,	   a	  Muslim	  woman’s	  
dress	  choice	  is	  more	  threatening	  than	  a	  Christian	  man’s	  speech.	  
Moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  woman	  who	  never	  tried	  to	  proselytize	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  public	  space	  
just	   because	   her	   image	   did	   not	   conform	   to	   the	   ‘western	   conception	   of	   liberated	   woman’	   is	   a	  
significant	   feature:	  not	  only	  does	   it	   reveal	   that	   in	   liberalism	   the	   individual	   emerges	  as	   an	  abstract	  
entity	  who,	  while	  enjoying	   the	  allowed	   freedoms	   s/he	   is	   also	   subjected	   to	   the	   state’s	   rules,	  but	   it	  
also	  unmasks	  the	  intrinsic	  paradoxes	  of	  positive	  and	  Human	  Rights	  law.	  In	  fact,	  if	  the	  individual	  has	  
‘equal	  rights’	  those	  rights	  can	  be	  regulated	  more	  or	  less	  depending	  on	  how	  abstractly	  or	  concretely	  
the	  individual	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  using	  these	  rights.	  The	  protection	  afforded	  to	  the	  individual	  by	  the	  
rule	  of	  law	  –certainty,	  predictability	  –	  follows	  this	  pattern.	  If	  Kokkinakis’s	  proselytizing	  is	  protected	  it	  
is	  because	  he	  did	  nothing	  but	  speak	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  convert	  another	  who	  is	  free	  to	  accept	  or	  
not;	  if	  Ms	  Dahlab	  was	  removed	  from	  sight	  it	  was	  because	  she	  demonstrated,	  performed,	  acted	  out	  
her	   right	   to	   be	   different,	   which	   carries	   illocutionary	   force.	   In	   essence	   by	   presenting	   her	   with	   the	  
alternative	  ‘unveil	  or	  lose	  your	  teaching	  job’	  the	  law	  hid	  Dahlab	  much	  more	  efficiently	  than	  any	  veil	  
                                           
9 In Greece proselytism is forbidden by constitution. For this reason, Mr Kokkinakis was judged guilty by the 
Greek Court. In fact, Article 13. 2 of the Greek constitution states: “There shall be freedom to practice any 
known religion; individuals shall be free to perform their rites of worship without hindrance and under the 
protection of the law. The performance of rites of worship must not prejudice public order or public morals. 
Proselytism is prohibited”. See (‘Constitution of Greece’ 2016) 
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could	  ever.	  For	  the	  veil,	  as	  all	  clothes	  do,	  does	  not	  hide	  but	  present	  humans	  to	  each	  other,	  whereas	  
the	   persona	   juridical,	   in	  modern	   law,	   isolates	   people	   from	   each	   other	   and	   connects	   them	   to	   the	  
state.	  
The	   veil	   cases	   I	   have	   taken	   into	   consideration	   show	   that	   the	   western	   project	   of	   universal	  
emancipation,	   through	   the	   combination	   of	   legal	   positivism	   and	   human	   rights,	   in	   reality	   works	   to	  
assimilate	   differences	   into	   the	   Christian/secular/liberal	   understanding	   of	   law	   and	   politic	   which	  
remains	   Eurocentric,	   phallocentric	   and	   logocentric.	   Failing	   to	   be	   re-­‐born	   in	   the	   image	   of	   modern	  
law’s	  subject	  results	  in	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  individual	  from	  public	  space	  because	  its	  very	  presence	  is	  
embarrassing.	  Dahlab	  was	  embarrassing	  because	   she	  was	  working	  happily	   in	   the	  centre	  of	  Europe	  
all-­‐dressed-­‐up	  in	  the	  wrong	  manner.	  Years	  ago	  it	  would	  have	  been	  a	  miniskirt.	  It	  is	  now	  the	  veil.	  
As	  I	  have	  argued,	  human	  rights	  and	  state	  law	  only	  protect	  an	  abstract	  secular	  individual,	  a	  ‘human-­‐
yet-­‐to-­‐become’	   that	   forever	   needs	   the	   state	   law	   in	   order	   to	   be	   human.	   The	   modern	   (juridical)	  
subject	  enters	   into	   the	   ‘universal	  human	  nature’	  by	  acquiring	   rights	  and,	  consequently,	   those	  who	  
do	  not	  get	  these	  rights	  are	  excluded;	  to	  have	  citizens	  we	  must	  have	  also	  ‘aliens’	  or,	  as	  Kristeva	  (1991)	  
puts	  it	  “never	  has	  democracy	  been	  more	  explicit,	  for	  it	  excludes	  no-­‐one-­‐except	  foreigners”(149).	  
The	   Dahlab	   and	   Sahin	   cases	   are	   instances	   of	   modern	   law	   constructing	   a	   ‘dehumanized’	   female,	  
victim	  of	  a	  (supposedly)	  chauvinist	  religious	  law,	  who	  must	  be	  re-­‐humanized	  as	  abstract	  individuals	  
at	  once	  legislators	  and	  subjects	  to	  the	  law.	  If	  they	  fail	  to	  be	  re-­‐born	  and	  reject	  inclusion	  in	  modern	  
law’s	  project	  of	   ‘juridical	  humanity’,	   they	   immediately	  return	  to	  a	  condition	  of	  being	   ‘pre-­‐human’.’	  
Therefore,	  are	  we	  really	  sure	  that	  the	   inclusion	  of	  de-­‐humanized	  people	  within	  the	  pale	  of	  Human	  
Rights	   law	   does	   not	   reproduce	   a	   colonial	   logic?	   Which	   political	   possibilities	   have	   those	   subjects	  
outside	  the	  pale	  of	  the	  law	  and	  awaiting	  humanitarian	  intervention?	  
Conclusion	  
According	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	   religious	   freedom	  is	  not	   limited	  to	  belief	  
but	   it	  extends	  also	  to	  its	  manifestations10	  and	  it	   is	   ‘one	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  democratic	  society’	  
(Kokkinakis	  v	  Greece,	  1993,	  para	  31);	  however,	  not	  every	  act	  based	  on	  religious	  belief	  is	  protected	  by	  
article	   9	   of	   the	   convention.	   In	   the	   ECHR’s	   decisions,	   it	   is	   the	   term	   ‘practice’	   in	   article	   9	   (1)	  which	  
                                           
10 The key provision in the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms with 
respect to freedom of religion is art. 9. 9.1 which states that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes the freedom either alone or in community with others and in public 
or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. Art. 9.2: 
“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. (‘European Convention on Human 
Rights - Convention_ENG.pdf’ 2016) 
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‘does	  not	  cover	  each	  act	  which	  is	  motivated	  or	  influenced	  by	  a	  religion	  or	  belief’	  (Arrowsmith	  v	  the	  
United	   Kingdom	   1978).	   In	   fact,	   the	   manifestation	   should	   be	   one	   of	   the	   ‘normal	   and	   recognized	  
manifestations’	   of	   religion	  or	   belief	   that	   ‘actually	   express	   the	  belief	   concerned’	   (Arrowsmith	   v	   the	  
United	  Kingdom	  1978,	  20).	  It	  is	  therefore	  unclear	  why	  the	  ECHR’s	  judges	  could	  not	  consider	  the	  veil	  a	  
‘normal	  manifestation’	  which	  expresses	  a	  profound	  religious	  belief	  (Evans	  2001).	  
This	   instance	  becomes	  clear	   if	  we	  assume	  that	  article	  9	  protects	  the	  rights	  of	  subjects	  who	  comply	  
with	   the	   principle	   of	   secularism	   and	   with	   a	   secular	   mode	   of	   experiencing	   religion.	   In	   fact,	   while	  
secularism	  conceives	  religion	  as	  a	  set	  of	  recommendations	  based	  on	  general	  beliefs	  (and	  so	  a	  matter	  
of	  ‘personal	  choice’),	  Mahmood’s	  work	  (2005)reveals	  that	  for	  Muslim	  believers,	  Islam	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  
set	  of	  commandments	  based	  on	  religious	  belief	  as	  in	  western	  secular	  thought,	  but	  a	  way	  to	  live	  and	  
inhabit	   the	   world,	   bodily	   and	   ethically:	   as	   their	   aim	   is	   to	   follow	   the	   example	   of	   the	   Prophet,	   a	  
“Muslim’s	   relationship	   to	   Mohammad	   is	   predicated	   not	   so	   much	   upon	   a	   communicative	   or	  
representational	   model	   as	   an	   assimilative	   one”	   (Mahmood	   2009,	   847).	   The	   western/secular	  
understanding	  of	   religion	  as	  a	   ‘private	  matter’	   is	   strictly	   linked	   to	   the	  place	  of	   religions	  within	   the	  
secular	   state	   (Keane	  2016)	  and	   to	   the	   role	  of	   the	   law	   in	   regulating	   religious	  practices,	   such	  as	   the	  
veil,	  in	  the	  public	  space.	  In	  this	  sense,	  secularism	  is	  not	  understood	  as	  the	  mere	  separation	  between	  
temporal	  and	  spiritual	  power,	  but	  as	  the	  re-­‐conceptualisation	  of	  religious	  sensitivities	  and	  religious	  
practices	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  (Mahmood	  2009;	  Asad	  2003):	  thus,	  while	  secular	  thought	  has	  come	  to	  
define	   concepts	   of	   state,	   economy,	   religion	   and	   law,	   it	   simultaneously	   creates	   a	   specific	   law	   and	  
religious	   subject.	   As	   Gursel	   (2013)	   argues,	   “when	   certain	   forms	   of	   religiosity	   which	   are	   not	   in	  
compliance	   with	   the	   secular	   sensibilities	   of	   the	   state	   step	   out	   from	   the	   private	   sphere	   into	   the	  
public,	   this	   renders	   the	   individuals’	   acts	   suspect	   as	   if	   they	   are	   not	   religiously	   but	   politically	  
motivated”(10).	  
This	   is	  particularly	   clear	  when	  comparing	   the	  Dahlab	  and	  Kokkinakis	   cases	  which	   indicate	   that	   the	  
regulation	  of	  women’s	  body	   is	  particularly	  emblematic	  of	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	  paradoxes	  and	  
inherent	   contradictions	   of	   liberalism	   are	   reproduced.	   Kokkinakis’	   proselytizing	   speech	   befits	   the	  
model	   of	   the	   Christian/secular/’human’	   protected	   as	   an	   abstract	   equal	   citizen	   from	   the	   state;	   by	  
contrast	   Dahlab,	   whose	   body	   already	   assigns	   her	   to	   the	   order	   of	   an	   asset	   for	   concrete	   societal	  
reproduction,	  engaged	  in	  a	  performative	  speech-­‐act	  that	  has	  to	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  state.	  Otherwise	  
she	  should	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  public	  space;	  she	  should	  disappear.	  
Hence,	   in	   the	   liberal	   West,	   the	   subject	   of	   law,	   the	   citizen,	   has	   the	   autonomy	   to	   express	   her/his	  
identity	  only	  when	   those	   identities	   can	  be	  assimilated	   in	   liberal	   secular	   thought.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  
western	  discourse	  over	  the	  hijab	  not	  only	  overlooks	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  historical,	  social	  and	  religious	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meaning	   symbolized	  by	   the	   veil,	   but	   it	   also	   highlights	  western	   incapacity	   to	   think	   the	   plurality,	   as	  
revealed	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Sahin	  case	  (Sahin	  v	  Turkey,	  2005).	  
The	   ECHR’s	   legal	   decisions	   over	   the	   practice	   of	   veiling	   indicate	   that	   secularism	   is	   not	   a	   neutral	  
position:	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  “normatively	  prescriptive	  model	  that	  favours	  certain	  forms	  of	  modern	  religion	  
at	   the	   expense	   of	   others	   that	   are	   equally	   legitimate”(Denli	   2004,	   497).	   In	   the	   case,	   the	   secular	  
position	  of	  the	  ECHR’s	  judges	  led	  the	  Court	  to	  approve	  a	  series	  of	  repressive	  and	  illiberal	  measures:	  
in	   the	   name	   of	   national	   security	   and	   gender	   equality,	   the	   ECHR’s	   judges	   have	   deeply	   limited	   the	  
possibility	   of	   agency	   of	   many	   Muslim	   women	   in	   Europe.	   Therefore,	   “the	   political	   solution	   that	  
secularism	  proffers…lies	  not	  so	  much	   in	   tolerating	  difference	  and	  diversity	  but	   in	   remaking	  certain	  
kinds	   of	   religious	   subjectivities	   (even	   if	   this	   requires	   the	   use	   of	   violence)	   so	   as	   to	   render	   them	  
compliant	  with	  liberal	  political	  rule”	  (Mahmood	  2006,	  328).	  
In	   this	   sense,	   the	   human	   rights	   project	   of	   humanity’s	   salvation	   in	   reality	   works	   to	   assimilate	   the	  
individual	   into	  Christian/secular/liberal	  understanding	  of	  law	  and	  politic.	  Failing	  to	  assimilate	  into	  a	  
new	   law’s	   subject	   means	   the	   disappearance	   of	   the	   individual	   from	   the	   public	   space	   because	   it	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